The following is from a dialog I’ve been having with an atheist on this discussion board thread: http://www.rationalresponders.com/forum/14534. The atheist’s responses follow the colons: “::”
It is a somewhat technical (albeit amateurish) discussion on epistemology. These responses are “off the cuff”, not exquisitely refined. They are nonetheless a little window into what I’ve been exploring recently, especially in critical realist epistemology, and Alister McGrath’s approach in his new book “The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology”. I’d, of course, love to hear your thoughts, if you’re interested in this kind of nerdy stuff, and have the tenacity to tread through this whole thing!
Here goes…
I do not disagree that the empirical method is a reliable and extremely helpful tool for knowing and understanding reality. The reason I harp on its limitations is because it is, for many atheists I’ve discovered, assumed to be the ONLY reliable and helpful tool for knowing and understanding reality, or indeed the tool that trumps all other competing ways of knowing and understanding reality.
The question that was naïvely ignored by modernity (and many atheists…and Christians, too, for that matter) is: “But how do we know the empirical process itself?” You see, I would say (following many respected epistemologists) that all knowledge comes through the use of certain tools or channels or methods. The empirical process is one channel for knowing reality. But what is the channel or process through which we come to know the empirical process? What lies tacitly beneath your statement “There is no reason for doubting my senses”?
This is simplified and imperfect, but I think it looks something like this:
(a) data is transmitted to your senses
(b) your senses transmit data to your brain
(c) You make some fallible assumptions into which you must take a “leap” of uncertainty:
(C1) That the data transmitted to my senses is accurate
(C2) That my senses work properly in transmitting that data to my brain?
(C3) That my intellect capable of properly interpreting this data?
(c) You test out the reliability of those assumptions in step (c).
(d) You discover that those assumptions seem to be reliable and resonate well with the big picture of life.
Again this is oversimplified, but it is somewhat helpful for our conversation. The reality is that the process of knowing is both top-bottom as well as bottom-top. There is a kind of synergism involved here. Only through this synergistic process can you say “There is no reason for doubting my senses.”
So to say “I believe because there is no reason not to believe” is to assume that the default position of the human knower is to believe that which is presented to him (again, an oversimplified statement). I would agree. This is true not only of our senses, but also the testimony of others, and—I would say—even our intuition. (There are probably more things we could throw into that “default” as well.)
We assent to things until some kind of cognitive dissonance is introduced into the picture to make us question the validity of that thing. As such, we believe p because p “resonates” with everything else we understand concerning reality. When we are presented with a choice between p and q, we decide between them based on which option resonates best with our experience of reality.
I understand that this process is very similar to what Thomas Kuhn describes in Structures of Scientific Revolutions. McGrath points to Jean Piaget’s model of “equilibration” as another example of this. Here is an excerpt from McGrath’s book The Open Secret, the chapter on “The Psychology of Perception”:
The account of perception that we have given thus far is of a dialectic process in which sensory input is made sense of in terms of pre-existing perceptual schemas, which have themselves developed as part of the process of acting on sensory input. The perceiver both acts on the world and is acted upon by the world. Processing is both top-down and bottom-up. The perceiver organizes data, but the organizational system employed is itself influenced by the type of data it is required to handle, and has some invariant features or predispositions built into it, presumably as the outcome of natural selection.
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McGrath:
The two sides of this process have been referred to as “assimilation of” and “accommodation to” the world by Piaget. For Piaget, there exists a process of “reflecting abstraction” through which human beings interact with their environment. Human beings are not born with such structures, nor do they absorb them passively from their environment: they construct them through a process of interaction (which Piaget terms “equilibration”), in which equilibrium is achieved between assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation may be defined as the “act of incorporating objects or aspects of objects into learned activities,” where accommodation is “the modification of an activity or ability in the face of environmental demands.” Generally these two processes balance each other, but accommodation to the world begins to dominate when the perceiver encounters phenomena that do not readily fit into existing schemas. This sort of situation involves cognitive challenge and possibly stress, but the outcome may often be a reorganization or development of schemas so that they are more differentiated, complex, and in keeping with the sensory phenomena. Thus there is a cycle of assimilation–challenge–accommodation–assimilation–challenge–accommodation under-
pinning the process of perception and its development.
(end of excerpt from McGrath)
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So anyway, this is essentially the process through which the empirical method is appropriated and affirmed as a reliable epistemological tool. The ideas of “resonance” and “equilibrium” are essentially the same, I think.
:: I only claimed certainty regarding FACTS, nothing more! Facts are certain, unless you can present evidence that facts and our senses are untrustworthy. Your only argument for this was the fallacy from inductive uncertainty when you said that we could not be absolute certain about our senses. This is a red herring. That fact our senses are not absolutely certain does not mean they are not untrustworthy.
I never said that our senses are “untrustworthy” because we cannot be absolutely certain about them, did I? My only contention was that you cannot be absolutely certain about them, not that they are untrustworthy. Those are two completely different things. “Trustworthiness” does not necessarily entail “absolute certainty.”
This is a trustworthy, but not “absolutely certain” statement: “When I turn the key in my car’s ignition, its engine will start.” It’s trustworthy because that is what usually happens, and I do not have reason to doubt it will happen. It is not “absolutely certain” because something could have happened to my car without my knowing that will cause it not to start (e.g. someone siphoned the gas from my tank, etc.).
I would agree that (per your definition) “facts” are trustworthy. I do not agree that “facts” are “absolutely certain.” There is absolutely no fallacy in that recognition whatsoever, so far as I can see. If you think there is, then please justify that statement rather than stamping it with a so-called fallacy. Explain why it is a fallacy. Show me the error in this argument:
1. That the sky is blue is a “fact” (per your definition).
2. We know the sky is blue because our senses tell us so.
3. We cannot be absolutely, 100% certain that our senses give us accurate information about reality
4. Therefore we cannot be absolutely certain about “facts”
Note, again, that this says nothing about “trustworthiness” of the senses. It is merely the recognition of a threshold limiter to our certainty that cannot be surpassed into “absolute certainty.” The lack of recognition of this epistemic boundary is one of the weaknesses of Enlightenment Foundationalism, pointed to by theistic and non-theistic philosophers alike.
:: This is already been explained to you! We know [that the scientific method is reliable] via the scientific method.
No. All you have done is demonstrate circular reasoning. To justify the validity of the scientific method with the scientific method itself is circular. That should be obvious to you. It is like me saying “I know that the Bible is true because it says it is true.” That is circular too. My point is that, to a certain degree, circularity is a necessary aspect of the epistemological process. This has been demonstrated by Jean Piaget, as well as Michael Polanyi (both of whom were both very scientific epistemologists who include a significant amount of scientific research in their arguments, and neither of which had a theistic agenda to their work) and many others.
:: The scientific method limits/removes bias, is the most objective method we have, and it is continuously successful.
It is very helpful in the search for objectivity, but it does not limit/remove the bias of its own assumed truth-bearing nature; it is not (indeed cannot be, I don’t think) objective with relation to itself. The only reason you can say it is “continuously successful” is because you once assumed it to be reliable, and it has not proven otherwise. It is “continuously successful”, but only “from the inside” of presupposing that it is true.
:: And you've presented no alternatives.
Yes I have. Testimony, for example. I even provided you links to some excellent writing on the epistemology of Testimony (the last issue of Episteme journal, for example). Intuition is another factor worth seriously considering, rather than dismissing it categorically without good reason. As I understand, epistemologists such as Alan Goldman have defended intuition (with qualification) through Reliabilism. There are other factors in the process of knowing too, such as prioritization and the fact that a person has to feel like something is worth knowing before they seek knowledge of it. “Resonance” and equilibrium also play into this process. And that’s the tip of the iceberg. McGrath gives an excellent assessment of the psychological aspects of this process in his chapter on the “Psychology of Perception” in The Open Secret: a New vision for Natural Theology (the chapter is actually written by Joanna Collicutt, who is a lecturer in psychology).
Seriously consider the Matrix movie. Try to put yourself in the position of Neo. It is a hypothetical situation in which the very signals being sent to our brains, giving us data about reality, is called into question. This data typically goes without being questioned at all because, as you point out, we don’t have a reason to doubt it.
Think of the expression “the squeaky wheel gets the oil.” When we drive our car, we are not really consciously aware of all the mechanisms that work together to put us into motion, until something goes wrong. When something does go wrong, we pop open the hood and try to see what is the matter, and notice our oil is low, or radiator fluid is leaking, or whatever. When things work well all the time, we can easily take things for granted as being much simpler than they really are. When things go wrong, it forces us to think about these things we take for granted.
The Matrix/BIV analogies are really just a helpful way of causing us to stop and think about the epistemic complexities that we take for granted. If someone we had known for a long time, who we really respected, who had always proven to be a reliable source of information were to tell us in all seriousness that our experiences of reality were really just fabrications of computers being transmitted to us via electronic signals to our brains, we would be forced to reckon with (among other things, such as the epistemic nature of testimony) why we should or should not trust our senses. We couldn’t use science to prove that our friend was mistaken, because science itself would be called into question; science itself would be part of the illusion.
In the process of seeking objective truth, it should be our goal to bring our attention to the tacit epistemological processes that usually do not get our attention. It should not necessarily take a “squeaky wheel” to get us to think critically about it. We should be seeking it anyway. No we don’t have a reason NOT to believe our senses, but that should not keep us from trying to explore the process behind why we DO believe it.
Objectivity is explicitly concerned with thinking critically about our presuppositions. If “our senses tell us the truth” is a presupposition (which it is), then we should be critically examining it. That is exactly what postmodern epistemologists (and philosophers after them) have done. That has been what I understand Alister McGrath has been concerned with in his three-volume Scientific Theology: looking closely and thinking critically about the methodology behind science and theology that has often gone unexamined.
That methodology consists (at least in part) of what I outlined in my last post. But there are many places in which people explain it far better than me (such as McGrath’s chapter on psychology of perception).
:: You've STILL not presenting reasons for why our senses are untrustworthy. You're only making naked assertions!!
I’m not saying they are untrustworthy. Nor is it relevant whether or not there are those “reasons” (see above). Consider the fact that you are making the “naked assertion” that we should let our belief in our senses remain without question unless we have good reason to doubt them.
:: I however can make an argument for the reliability of our sense: our senses are repeatably and independently confirmed via the scientific method to such a degree that there is not reason to doubt them.
Again, in the Matrix scenario, your argument would be irrelevant, because the scientific method would be irrelevant as “proof” (though not irrelevant as “resonance”). You must come to grips with this, but as of yet you have not. All those scientific “confirmations” you point to would be alleged fabrications of the machine to which you’re hooked up. Yes, it would be “reliable”, but that reliability would only be “from within” the Matrix. It would be “reliable” in that it is intrinsically/internally consistent and thus “resonant.”
The reason I don’t believe I’m in a Matrix is not because of the scientific method per se, but ultimately because that belief would not be useful in anyway to help me live my life. If I do not see proof, or other good reasons to believe in the Matrix, then the proposition of the Matrix does not disturb my “equilibrium” enough to force me to adjust the paradigm of my worldview. The best “resonance” is achieved, then, through NOT believing in the Matrix, believing instead in the truth-bearing nature of the signals sent to my brain. I maintain that paradigm (“I can trust my senses”) until equilibrium is disturbed, or an alternative with greater equilibrium and resonance is found.
:: Unless you can present a method that is as good as, if not better than empiricism, at verifying claims, then your complain is a red herring. So far you've failed to to this. What you presented was not only not on par with empiricism, it could not even be used to verify the truth of claims..
I beg to differ. Not only is it “on par” with empiricism, it is what empiricism itself demands and employs. The “method” of which I’m speaking is the very method we use in order to affirm empiricism. I recommend you re-read what I’ve said about “best explanation”, “resonance”, etc., as well as the process of “equilibration”. Better yet, go read some of the articles I posted, or buy or check out from the library McGrath’s book The Open Secret, or look into his Scientific Theology series.
:: The default position is to withhold belief unless we have evidence/reason to accept. We are to assume it is wrong until we have reason to believe otherwise. With our sense and the scientific method, we DO have evidence of reliability, we thus are justified in holding them as trustworthy.
Ok, now think about this. You now say the default position is to withhold belief. If that is the case, then you should be applying that to the scientific method itself. The process would look something like this:
Step One: Withhold belief that the scientific method is true
Step Two: Find evidence that the scientific method is true.
Step Three: Believe that the scientific method is true.
Again, the problem with this is that you are applying the scientific method itself as “evidence” for Step two. This is circular reasoning.
Take the same approach to the Matrix/BIV scenario:
Step 1: Withhold belief that the signals being sent to your brain accurately reflect reality.
Step 2: Find evidence that the signals being sent to your brain accurately reflect reality.
Step 3: Believe that the signals being sent to your brain accurately reflect reality.
Here too you are applying the scientific method to step 2. The problem is that the scientific method rests upon these signals (you get data from the scientific method via these brain signals). If you are “withholding belief” from these brain signals, then you would also, necessarily, be withholding belief from the scientific method. If you are withholding belief from the scientific method, then you cannot use it in step 2 in order to get to step 3 without your reasoning becoming circular.
Your approach is (unbelief-evidence-belief). But as I’ve pointed out, this process is viscously circular. But as I think about it (at 4:21am!!!), it seems that the converse (belief-evidence-unbelief) actually avoids that circularity (at least the “visciousness” of it). You see, your approach explicitly demands non-circularity, but tacitly employs it, and is thus self-contradictory. The converse approach does not demand non-circularity, but acknowledges the necessity of a degree of circularity (at least in the “leap” that is necessary to step into the proposition and test its resonance), and unabashedly employs it. You don’t necessarily have to find absolute proof in order to believe it. You find the evidence to believe it (at least partly) from the inside of that belief—the evidence being that it is a reliable process. No, that reliability is not “proof” (for example) that signals sent to the brain are true to reality. But the more you find yourself in equilibrium from within that position, the more you see it as reliable, and the less it really matters that you find that “proof.” The proof then only matters when dissonance (i.e. evidence against it) is introduced.
But that (above), again, is an over-simplification. The reality is that the process is quite complex and synergistic. Your approach (doubt-evidence-belief) might be called a “bottom-top” approach. The converse (belief-evidence-doubt) might be called a “top-bottom” approach. I think that the process of knowing is synergistic, incorporating both “bottom-top” and “top-bottom,” somehow. We process data (or evidence) using pre-existing schemas; and yet those schemas are also shaped by data. Which comes first: the chicken or the egg? It is difficult to say. Perhaps it is best to think in terms of synergistic process than an absolute starting point? I don’t know.
Sorry this is so long (and took me so long). I’m really trying hard to communicate clearly, but at the same time, this is a process of discovery for me even while I’m writing. I’m certainly not a pro at this (in case you couldn’t tell—ha!). Thanks for your patience! Have a good day!
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